The Aims of this Blog peace
The aims of this research are to explore the reasons why great powers lose Small Wars and conflicts, from 1839 to the present day, to include the current war on terror and the war in Afghanistan, as well as other conflicts that involve great powers fighting what can be perceived to be unwinnable wars. Throughout the work the project will focus on political reasons why great powers lose Small Wars; the cultural reasons and the military reasons why great powers lose small conflicts; the legacy of the Vietnam war and the previous Anglo involvement in Afghanistan, which must be understood within the context of why great powers lose Small Wars. This work will also require an understanding of terrorism and why wars in the contemporary era are often no longer fought by traditional state actors, but also by nonstate actors such as Islamic State and Al Qaeda in addition to individuals inspired by a particular ideology e.g. Mohammed Emwazi or the murder of Lee Rigby; Small Wars then become an ideological conflict which great powers struggle to deal with. The dissertation will also require an understanding of what a Small War is and what is meant by great power involvement itself in a Small War; a Small War can be understood in terms of a conflict that does not lead to a state of total war this being a fight to the death and survival of the state for example the Peloponnesian War can be described as a major conflict between two equal powers that being Athens and Sparta. However, in the context of a great power fighting a Small War against a lesser power or nonstate actors such as the Taleban in Afghanistan and the North Vietnamese fighting US intervention in South Vietnam. Therefore, from the perspective of the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war the conflict was a major war and a fight for survival but in contrast to the great powers such as the United States fighting in Vietnam and also coalition forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan the conflict is a Small War which great powers can afford to lose because it is not a fight for survival. This means that great powers involved in a Small War in a protracted conflict suffering losses this means there is far more incentive from home to withdraw from the conflict without any perceivable benefits to the populous and to the state to continue the conflict abroad.
The Graveyard of empires
This dissertation will start with why Britain at the height of its Empire lost the 1838 to 1842 invasion of Afghanistan and why the British Empire failed for a second time, 1878 to 1880 to successfully conquer Afghanistan. Also examined will be the Third Anglo-Afghan War, which started on 6 May 1919 when the Emirate of Afghanistan invaded British India and ended with an armistice on 8 August 1919. The war resulted in the Afghans winning back control of foreign affairs from Britain, and the British recognising Afghanistan as independent. Looking at these three Anglo Afghan conflicts will help provide reasons why the Soviet Union in 1979 to 1989 failed to subdue Afghanistan and is partly a contributing factor to the fall of the Soviet Union. The first three Anglo Afghan Wars will also help provide reasons why in the current war in Afghanistan by the United States and coalition forces in 2001 are still fighting to create a democratic Afghanistan on a Western model of governing and creating a society in Afghanistan which is liberal and is supportive of the West.
One reason why the British failed to conquer Afghanistan in 1838 to 1842, along with the invasion of 1878 to 1880 failed is because of British motivations to conquer Afghanistan where found upon a false premise which was the fear that the Russian Empire would invade British India. This fear of a war with Russia is partly a consequence of the attitude of international relations particularly the concept of an anarchic environment. In the field of international relations this is where the belief is in an anarchic environment where states must fend for themselves or face destruction, this attitude resulted in conquest which was done in order to survive in an environment where every state is a potential enemy or competitor. This view and attitude can best be understood through the works of John J Mearsheimer who is an international relations theorist (of international relation school of thought of offensive realism). Offensive realism is where states seek to maximise their power at the expense of other nations and use any means necessary to secure the nation’s interests. This explains why the British invaded Afghanistan twice and why the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 was purely because of national self-interest and fear. The British were concerned about Russian expansionism but there was no serious consideration of the Russians to expand into India since Paul the First of Russia 1796 to 1801. However, despite there being any realistic reason to invade Afghanistan the war as far as the British view is concerned was motivated by national security which imperial territories also count as internal affairs for the British government. It is also important to mention the ruler of Afghanistan Dost Muhammad, Emir of Afghanistan, December 23, 1793 – June 9, 1863 – 1863. Reigned 1826 – 2 August 1839, 1845 – 9 June 1863 who stated that;
‘I have been struck by the magnitude of your resources, your ships, your arsenals, but what I cannot understand is why the rulers of so vast and flourishing an empire should have gone across the Indus to deprive me of my poor and barren country.[1]’
This is relevant because Afghanistan has no mineral resources yet in its history it has been invaded by Alexander the great, Genghis Khan, the Mogul Empire, British Empire and Soviet Union as well as countless others who have failed to subdue Afghanistan the most recent being the United States and the NATO coalition in 2001. By understanding the motivations of the British Empire and the history of Afghanistan can provide one reason why great powers lose Small Wars and are involved conflicts that have no strategic or military reason but are caused by political and ideological concerns, that cannot garner support from the British public and without support from a nation’s populous a Small War will be doomed to defeat for a great power. The lack of public support and political motivations for conflicts in Small Wars shall be a theme throughout this dissertation.
A second reason why the British lost the first Afghan War and how it relates to why great powers lose Small Wars is by understanding the repeated failures of great power nations such as the British, Soviet Union and the United States have all failed when it comes to propping up a regime. This can be seen in the US support of the South Vietnamese government and the British during the first Afghan War as well as the Soviet Union and its failure in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Great powers propping up regimes is relevant because without the support of local people’s the propped-up government will fall because it lacks legitimacy and without legitimacy the regime will always be weak and undermined by the fact that it cannot survive without a great power backer. This can be seen in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan as well as during the first Anglo Afghan War where
“To replace one ruler by another in a country which has transferred its allegiance eight times in the past 45 years did not seem a formidable project nor one which was likely to present much difficulty to a power whose progress in the domination of India had been one of steady and unbroken success.[2]”
The changing of regimes during the period in which the British were involved in Afghanistan in 1838 to 1841 is good at showcasing why great powers lose Small Wars because without the support of the local populace or a regime that is loyal to the British, defeat comes not if it should happen but when it shall happen. This is particularly relevant to the British Empire because during the 19th century and after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, 1815, the British Empire began on a period of massive expansion in India. This is due to Britain’s national enemy was finally defeated after a rivalry spanning from 1066 until France’s defeat at Waterloo. This history is relevant because the British depended upon its trade and its navy for the continual survival of the Empire this is relevant to why great powers lose Small Wars because the British depended upon loyal vassals that slowly became subjugated and integrated into the British Empire such as the Rajas of India. This is important to why the British lost the first Anglo Afghan War because of the very nature of the British Empire which never favoured having a strong standing army. This is due to the tyranny of James II and aftermath of his abdication/removal from the throne of Britain during the glorious Revolution of 1689 to 1690. The importance of this history and its relevance to why great powers lose Small Wars are relevant and important because it helps to explain why the British lost in Afghanistan and why the British had difficulties subduing the Zulus in the 1870s as well as fighting the second Boar War. This difficulty for the British to fight and occupy territory is caused because in Great Britain during this time period and perhaps today to a far lesser extent the legacy of the 1889 glorious Revolution is the British public do not like large armies because they are viewed as a means by which to suppress British liberty. By understanding the cultural sensitivities and political culture of the British helps to provide a strong reason why great powers such as Great Britain could not defeat the Afghans during the first Anglo Afghan War. The reason is that the British Empire was the most successful Empire the world had ever seen was due to three main reasons; trade, the British Navy and the fact the British adopted a similar policy to the Romans. This policy of the Roman Empire which the British adopted its use of tributes and vassals to subdue a local population as well as using local hate to divide and conquer the people and then slowly occupied territory under direct British rule piece by piece. However, the strategy failed in Afghanistan because the British don’t conquer and destroy they divide and occupy and therefore lack the capabilities to fight any meaningful war because of lack of political will for conflict.
Another reason the British Empire failed in the first Anglo Afghan War was partly due to the failures of George Eden, 1st Earl of Auckland who was an English Whig politician and colonial administrator. He was three times First Lord of the Admiralty and also served as Governor-General of India between 1836 and 1842. Lord Auckland is responsible to a great extent for the failure of the British during the Anglo Afghan War of 1838 to 1842 because;
“Lord Auckland, had fought well at Waterloo, 27 years earlier, but now, infirm in mind and body and ignorant of the country or people with which he was dealing, he was faced with a crisis requiring speed, decision, and leadership, in all of which qualities he was deficient.[3]”
It is fair to at least attribute part of the failure in Afghanistan during the first Anglo Afghan War to Lord Auckland because he was a man not fully comprehending undertaking of the conquest of Afghanistan and the challenge which would be necessary to secure people that resisted Genghis Khan. This is relevant because;
“in war all methods to rid himself of an invader are fair to an Afghan, and I am by no means certain that if these islands were invaded we should not be of the same mind.[4]”
It is important to truly understand and comprehend the means in which the Afghans will go to defend their nation even though the country is dirt poor and of no meaningful significance but like our own fair nation we would defend it against foreign invaders. One of the brutal means the Afghans employed to defeat British was assassinations and foul play such as Sir William Hay Macnaghten, 1st Baronet was a British civil servant in India, who played a major part in the First Anglo-Afghan War, was assassinated 23 December 1841, Kabul, Afghanistan. It is also important to mention the actions of Major-General William George Keith Elphinstone who Died 23 April 1842, Afghanistan. Elphinstone was promoted to Major-General in 1837, and, in 1841, during the First Anglo-Afghan War, placed in command of the British garrison in Kabul, Afghanistan, numbering around 4,500 troops, of whom 690 were European and the rest Indian. The garrison also included 12,000 civilians, including soldiers’ families and camp followers. He was elderly, indecisive, weak, and unwell, and proved himself utterly incompetent for the post. His entire command was massacred during the British retreat from Kabul during January 1842. By understanding the people involved in the first Anglo Afghan War particularly the British command helps to highlight why great powers lose Small Wars and they lose them because they do not possess the correct people who are knowledgeable and know how to fight the guerrillas who use unconventional warfare. It is important to establish that was are fought in two main ways the first is conventional warfare is where two armies fight for supremacy and then capture the country’s capital such as the Germans conquering France in 1940. This is a clear example of where one state captures the capital and declares victory; unconventional warfare is to fight multiple geographic areas, it is easier to explain as this where a force is overpowered and underequipped to fight the enemy, alternative means such as guerrilla tactics must be used destroying supply lines and terrorising the enemy to create a situation where continuing to fight becomes a cost that is not materially or politically sustainable.
The overall goal of the British during the first Afghan War was to create a vassal state loyal to the British Empire and to serve as a barrier between the Russian Empire because of fears of aggression from Russia and threats of expanding into British India. In this environment lies an overall reason why great powers lose Small Wars, that being lack of commitment and lack of an overall strategic objective or grand strategy involved in small conflicts.
Russell Colvin, a British civil servant in India, part of the illustrious Anglo-Indian Colvin family. John Russell Colvin writing to his father, 22nd of December 1841 stated that
“Our great experiment of consolidating Afghanistan is, in short, a failure, except as a course which, even if we could, for any period continue to bear it, would be wholly disproportionate to its objective.[5]”
The above statement clearly helps to articulate the point that great powers lose Small Wars because they do not understand or more correctly the political community and civil service are not prepared or adequately skilled to have clear and conceivable objectives in a long-term conflict, particularly when regarding Small Wars. It is also important to point out how committed goals differ in priority and necessity between a great power and a small power because great powers can afford to lose Small wars that small powers will fight desperately to be victorious. The diary of a camp follower articulates this point; Florentia Sale was an Englishwoman who travelled the world while married to her husband, Sir Robert Henry Sale, a British army officer.
“November 26… Today, the Afghans lined the hills; some thousands of them, with many horsemen. They afterwards came down to the plain, and we expected an attack upon the cantonments. On the nearest approach, they were found to be mostly unarmed; some had sticks, some sticks with a knife tied on the end of them: they were merely the shopkeepers come out to look battles. The Afghan night is a very formidable weapon, about 2 feet long, and thicker, stronger and broader than a sword, and as sharp as possible.[6]”
The statements made by Florentia Sale a camp follower during the first Afghan War and John Russell Colvin a British civil servant clearly identify why great powers lose Small Wars because great powers particularly liberal democracies that must answer to the people. But in the case of the British Empire at this time which could best be described as a quasi-democracy in this description lies a reason why great powers lose Small Wars. That being without the support of one’s own electorate or support of the people or at least sufficient support in a dictatorship or in a quasi-democracy the campaign will fail without the support of one’s own people. This clearly can be seen in the response by the British government to abandon the campaign in Afghanistan where in contrast the Afghans are willing to fight a far superior enemy by using merely clubs and knives. The statements and arguments that have been used during the description of why great powers loose Small Wars in this case the British in Afghanistan the points mentioned above will be highlighted and repeated throughout this dissertation, because Small Wars tend to have repeating factors and outcomes regarding actions of great powers and why they lose Small Wars.
The second Afghan Anglo war of 1879 to 1880 ended in victory for the British however the complex packed again in 1919 however despite this is important to describe the second Anglo Afghan War in order to provide context and understanding of the third Anglo Afghan War. First of all it is important to describe the causes of the conflict in 1879 started partly due to revenge the defeat of the first Anglo Afghan War but also because of international tensions in the late 1870s. This is because in the late 1870s Russia was gaining territory in the old Ottoman Empire which comprised mostly of the old territories of the Eastern Roman Empire however expanded into Arabia and modern-day Iraq bordering Afghanistan. With the Russians seizing territories from the Ottomans and it is important to note that British foreign policy regarding Ottoman Empire in the 19th century comprised the British propping up a decaying Empire. This can be seen in the Crimean War, (October 1853–February 1856), war fought mainly on the Crimean Peninsula between the Russians and the British, French, and Ottoman Turkish, with support from January 1855 by the army of Sardinia-Piedmont. This history is important to the subject matter of why great powers loose small wars because it is important to note why the British continually invaded Afghanistan and that was to protect the Russian threats because in 1978 at the Berlin conference former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli stated that;
“if you do not sign this treaty I shall get on this train and declare war on Russia[7]”.
This background to the war in 1879 to 1880 which ended victorious for the British with the Afghans would have no control over their foreign policy because of British fears of Russians expanding empire.
Even though the British won the second Anglo Afghan War is still highlights why great powers lose Small Wars particularly in foreign environments where the culture and attitudes are alien to the occupiers particularly been highly resistant this can be seen in the course of the second Anglo Afghan War. Major General Sir Frederick Roberts led the Kabul Field Force over the Shutargardan Pass into central Afghanistan, defeated the Afghan Army at Charasiab on 6 October 1879, and occupied Kabul two days later. Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan Wardak, and a force of 10,000 Afghans, staged an uprising and attacked British forces near Kabul in the Siege of the Sherpur Cantonment in December 1879. Despite besieging the British garrison there, he failed to maintain the Siege of Sherpur, instead shifting focus to Roberts’ force, and this resulted in the collapse of this rebellion. Yaqub Khan, suspected of complicity in the massacre of Cavagnari and his staff, was obliged to abdicate. The British considered a number of possible political settlements, including partitioning Afghanistan between multiple rulers or placing Yaqub’s brother Ayub Khan on the throne, but ultimately decided to install his cousin Abdur Rahman Khan as emir instead. Ayub Khan, who had been serving as governor of Herat, rose in revolt, defeated a British detachment at the Battle of Maiwand in July 1880 and besieged Kandahar. Roberts then led the main British force from Kabul and decisively defeated Ayub Khan on 1 September at the Battle of Kandahar, bringing his rebellion to an end. Abdur Rahman had confirmed the Treaty of Gandamak, leaving the British in control of the territories ceded by Yaqub Khan and ensuring British control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy in exchange for protection and a subsidy. Abandoning the provocative policy of maintaining a British resident in Kabul, but having achieved all their other objectives, the British withdrew. This brief outline of the course of the conflict demonstrates why controlling Afghanistan is so hard is due to the populous and the various competing factions being resistant outside rule.
The consequences and the aftermath of the third Anglo Afghan War of 1919 tells us why great powers lose Small Wars because during this conflict Afghans gained the right to control its foreign policy except with certain assurance. That looseness of the 1921 treaty satisfied few, for the question of the Pushtum tribes in British India remained, and ambiguous statements in the treaties made the Afghans again demanded clarification. The British representative, Sir Henry Dobbs, sent a supplementary letter to Mahmud Tarzi which became a part of the Anglo Afghan Treaty of 1921 and including the proposition:
“as the condition of the frontier tribes of the two governments are of interest to the government of Afghanistan I inform you that the British government entertains feelings of goodwill toward all the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating them generously, providing they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India.[8]”
The understanding of British fears outlines Britain’s foreign policy and why great powers lose Small Wars because the goal during all three Afghan Wars was motivated by fears of the Russian Empire and later revolutionary Russia after the October Revolution of 1917. This information explains that sometimes great powers lose Small Wars because their political objectives lies in other factors in the case of the British was protecting British India and halting Russian expansionism.
Political turmoil and outline of events provide another reason why great power lose Small Wars particularly in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is highly turbulent this resulted in a power struggle as Habibullah’s brother Nasrullah Khan proclaimed himself as Habibullah’s successor, while in Kabul Amanullah, Habibullah’s third son, had also proclaimed himself Amir. However, the Afghan army suspected Amanullah’s complicity in the death of his father. Needing a way of cementing his power, upon seizing the throne in April 1919 Amanullah posed as a man of democratic ideals, promising reforms in the system of government. He stated that there should be no forced labour, tyranny or oppression, and that Afghanistan should be free and independent and no longer bound by the Treaty of Gandamak. Upon seizing the throne, Amanullah had his uncle Nasrullah arrested for Habibullah’s murder and had him sentenced to life imprisonment. Nasrullah had been the leader of a more conservative element in Afghanistan and his treatment rendered Amanullah’s position as Amir somewhat tenuous. By April 1919 he realised that if he could not find a way to placate the conservatives he would be unlikely to maintain his hold on power. Looking for a diversion from the internal strife in the Afghan court and sensing advantage in the rising civil unrest in India following the Amritsar massacre, Amanullah decided to invade British India. This links into the first Afghan War because it further highlights how turbulent is Afghanistan, its political and tribal communities where disputes were and are often resolved through warfare and violence. Therefore, a reason why great powers lose Small Wars in Afghanistan is because the peoples of Afghanistan particularly in non-city centres where loyalty lies with tribes and warlords. This means that Afghanistan is not a traditional nation-state that tends to be where there is one political community and one place of central power and control, in the case of Afghanistan it can clearly be understood that Afghanistan has more than one central place of power. And because of this no outside forces are capable of dominating control of Afghanistan by supporting one particular faction which survival depends on its own force of arms. The United States Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps (Tales End Press. Kindle Edition) makes a compelling argument that when fighting Small Wars it is important to use as little and as few resources of your own as possible. In the case in the wars in Afghanistan and through most Small Wars that will be addressed in this dissertation great powers tend to use far more resources than the state or nonstate actors that they are fighting. This because they do not follow the principle that they should use local forces rather than their own when fighting on foreign soil because foreigners by their very presence will alienate the Afghanistan communities. Which will be a great recruiting sergeant for their opponents that great powers are trying to defeat.
[1] Page 6, Bellamy Chris, Small Wars Politics module # 30203 9. Afghanistan’s Plains, Professor Chris Bellamy Professor Emeritus Maritime Security University of Greenwich Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford Changing Character of War Programme, Pembroke College, Oxford Part 1, Published Online file:///C:/Users/Jonathan%20Riley/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/Hull%209.%20%20Afghanistan’s%20Plains.%20Final%20edited%20pART%201.pdf
[2] Page 106. Tytler-Fraser W. K., Revised by M.C. Gillett, AFGHANISTAN A STUDY OF Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Third Edition, Published by LONDON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK TORNTO In 1967
[3] Page 116. Tytler-Fraser W. K., Revised by M.C. Gillett, AFGHANISTAN A STUDY OF Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Third Edition, Published by LONDON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK TORNTO In 1967
[4] Page 119. Tytler-Fraser W. K., Revised by M.C. Gillett, AFGHANISTAN A STUDY OF Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Third Edition, Published by LONDON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK TORNTO In 1967
[5] Page 362. Norris A. J., THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 1838-1842, Published by CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1967
[6] Page 60. Florentia Sale was an Englishwoman who travelled the world while married to her husband, Sir Robert Henry Sale, a British army officer.
[7] Dr Brown Alan Brown, Gladstone and Disraeli, Published on Feb 14, 2015, Online YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZwBIY-o_cQ
[8] Page 446. Dupree Louis, Afghanistan, Published by PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCENTON, NEW JERESEY IN 1978
The Winter War
The Finland Soviet war of 1939 to 1940 more familiar as the winter war is far more of a classical conflict revolving the clashing of two mechanised forces but though this war has the classics of a large war in this case will be one of the few wars addressed in this dissertation that is classed as a Small War. The decision in this work which led to the winter war being classed as a Small War is because of a definition in the United States Marine Corps manual that stated that;
“The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power may be termed a Small War.[1]”
This definition of a Small War is relevant because Small Wars tend to be understood in the context that a traditional army is fighting nonstate actors such as terrorists and freedom fighters fighting a guerrilla war. However, in some cases conventional warfare can be classed as Small Wars is a small power such as Finland is fighting against a great power such as the Soviet Union this can be seen in the Finnish Soviet war and why it needs to be included in this dissertation. To understand why the Soviet Union invaded Finland it must be understood that the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War which lasted from1918 and 1921 before Soviets gained control of Russia which during this time period territories were lost such as Finland. The Russians are proud and a deeply patriotic people and the losses of the First World War and the Civil War after the Russian Revolution highlights the reason why Anastas Mikoyan Former First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union stated that
“‘you should be careful not to push the Russians too far. They have deep feelings in regard to this part of the world and… I can only tell you that we Caucasians in the Politburo are having a great deal of difficulty restraining the Russians.[2]’”
This comment highlights the importance of the Russians psyche and why the Soviet Union leadership was determined to restore the glory and prestige Russia and its territorial integrity of Russia and its borders before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
One reason why the Soviet Union failed to conquer Finland can be attributed to a large extent to Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, a Finnish military leader and statesman. Mannerheim served as the military leader of the Whites in the Finnish Civil War, Regent of Finland, Commander-in-Chief of Finland’s defence forces during World War II, Marshal of Finland, and the sixth president of Finland. The Mannerheim Line stretched along Hango, the Karelian Isthmus, and the north-eastern shore of Ladoga which was approximately over 20,000 mi.² long. The Mannerheim line was responsible for Russia’s defeat because of strategic planning of Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. The Finish used over 70,000 Molotov cocktails against Russian tanks and used the camouflage to fight against the Russians along Mannerheim Line by mid-December 1939 Stalin had lost over 25,000 Soviet troops. The Finnish also make good use of the train and using camouflage by wearing white uniforms in a guerrilla type warfare which is used to even the battle against the Soviets. This can be seen by the fact on 12 March, Zhdanov signed a treaty in which Finland Ceded Hango, the Karelian Isthmus, and the north-eastern shore of Ladoga, 22,000 square miles, to insulate Leningrad. Finland lost around 40,000 soldiers, Stalin over 125,000. Even though the Russians won the winter war of 1939 to 1940 it was a victory at a great price for the Russians which left the state of Finland intact but suffered some territorial losses along a strategic and geographically defensive line. However the winter war must be included in this dissertation because the Russians have a victory in name only whereas Finland managed to survive as a state independent from Russia as well as giving the Russians a bloodied nose.
Another reason why the Russians failed to achieve their objectives in the Winter War of 1939 to 1940 is strongly due to the paranoia of Joseph Stalin leader of the Soviet Union during this time period. Stalin interfered in the Russian military planning and insisted that the campaign against the advice of his military offices When
“Kulik’s accurately deputy, Voronov, later a famous Marshall, asked how much time was allocated for this operation, he was told, ‘between 10 and 12 days.’ Voronov thought it would take two or three months. Kulik greeted with this ‘derisive gibes’ and ordered him to work on a maximum of 12 days.[3]”
The statement above by one of the five original Marshals of the Soviet Union highlights a reason why great powers particularly those are dictatorships loose Small Wars is because a paranoid leadership such as Stalin interferes in military affairs which Stalin was an amateur commander not a professional strategist. It also pointed out by Marshal Klim Voroshilov
“‘You have yourself to blame for all of this. You’re the one who annihilated the old guard of our army, you had our best generals killed.’ [4]
Joseph Stalin’s purges of military officers of ability is a strong reason why the Russians failed during the Winter War of 1939 to 1940 was due to Stalin’s chronic paranoia of all those around and especially those who he viewed as a potential threat both real and imagined.
Overall from the Finnish Soviet war of 1939 to 1940 the lessons to be learned on why great powers lose Small Wars is this, try not to fight an enemy in the words of Sun Tzu attack an enemy where they a weak not where there are strong the strong replies to Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim defensive lines. Also, in the case that is not a unique regarding dictatorships it is unwise for a great power to murder its offices that are capable of fighting and winning a war.
Kindle Locations 93-94. United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual Tales End Press. Kindle Edition.
[2] Page 291. Montefiore Sebag Simon, STALIN The Court of the Red Tsar, Published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson LONDON in 2003
[3] Page 292. Montefiore Sebag Simon, STALIN The Court of the Red Tsar, Published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson LONDON in 2003
[4] page 293. Montefiore Sebag Simon, STALIN The Court of the Red Tsar, Published by Weidenfeld & Nicolson LONDON in 2003
Kenyan emergency and Irish troubles
The Kenyan emergency of 1952 to 1956 and the troubles in Northern Ireland provide a strong reason when contrasted of why great powers don’t have the support of the indigenous population will inevitably lose. However, it must be understood that great powers don’t lose Small Wars military they usually loose Small Wars because there is no longer political will in the political community and in their respective publics to continue the fight this can be seen contrasted of why Kenny gained independence but Northern Ireland reminds part of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland was more of British troops fighting insurgents. But in contrast to the war in Kenyan great resources and more traditional means used put down the Mau Mau revolt. The conflict in Ireland and later Northern Ireland spanned hundreds of years from the legacy of the Norman conquest of England to the Good Friday agreement in 1999, in contrast to the Kenyan emergency 1952 to 1956 which following the crushing of the Mau Mau revolt then Kenyan was on its way to independence by 1956, becoming independent in 1963. The way in which both conflicts differ to a great extent is in the use of appropriate force. In Kenya excessive amount of force was used which was totally inappropriate; in contrast with Northern Ireland which despite lasting from the IRA declaration of war 1939 to start of the troubles in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the ceasefire in the early 1990s until the Good Friday agreement of 1998, appropriate force was used. This can be understood because in the words of one general Sir George Erskine, Commander-in-Chief in Kenya during the Mau-Mau uprising stated that
“‘If the Army is required to intervene it should do so in such a way that it does not prejudice the natural progressive development of the territory. No lasting results will be obtained by the unintelligent use of force in all directions… to do this you must have a very good intelligence service. You must not be surprised to find that it is inadequate and your first task should be to build it up.[1]’”
By understanding this statement which tells us that the appropriate use of force must be used when putting down a rebellion because without the support of the indigenous peoples maintaining control will become impossible. An example of alienation can be seen by the use of Lancaster bombers which were not used during the Emergency, though Lincolns (a Lancaster derivative introduced in 1944) were. The latter flew their first mission on the 18th November 1953 and remained in Kenya until 28 July 1955, dropping nearly 6 million bombs. In response to the rebellion, many Kikuyu were relocated. Between 320,000-450,000 of them were moved into concentration camps. By placing the Kikuyu of whom 1.5 million pledged their allegiance to the Mau Mau rebellion and by the British placing the populous in concentration camps only managed to alienate Kenyans instead of winning hearts and minds in order to win the conflict. Although the British defeated the Mau Mau in 1956 Kenyan still became independent in 1963. But in contrast in Ireland and Northern Ireland there was the paramilitary organisations committed to independence or union with Britain. For example, Ulster volunteer Force was founded with the membership of 100,000 and was determined to remain part of the United Kingdom likewise the IRA was formed in 1913 this shows how the small war in Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland differs from the Mau Mau revolt because the divisions in Northern Ireland paramilitary organisations continue to exist to this day but rather unofficially. In 1922 the IRA began a major initiative designed to break North. In March 1922, political leaders Craig and Collins had met under the auspices of the British government in London. They met to discuss the position of Catholic minority in Northern Ireland in order to guarantee their welfare.
The Southern Irish government under Eamon De Valera, in particular, the formation of the new Irish Constitution in 1937 reaffirmed the distinct territorial and political integrity of Ireland. Article 1 of the document declared that the Irish nation reaffirmed its inalienable, indefensible and sovereign right to choose its own form of government and to determine its relations with other nations, while article 2 proclaimed that the national territory consisted of the whole island of Ireland. On 15 January 1939 the IRA Council declared war on Britain and issued a creation on 12 January at the British must withdraw or face war.
In the late 1960s the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland was ready to rebel because of all the discrimination they had suffered at the hands of Protestant majority in the North. In Londonderry itself, Catholics outnumbered Protestants by more than 2 to one, but manipulation of electoral boundaries ensured a Protestant dominance was maintained. Until the education act of 1947 made it possible for Catholic Irish in Northern Ireland to attend education in universities the Catholic Irish had been discriminated against and refused admission. From 1969 to 1975 the number of fatalities in Northern Ireland relative to the population was twice that of the losses sustained during the Boer War and twice that of the deaths suffered by the United States in Korea and Vietnam. By understanding how the war developed and how the war in Kenya was a unified environment for independence and that the conflict in Northern Ireland was caused by ethnic tensions and that the Catholic minority were treated badly by Protestants. Also, the fact that British troops were sent to Northern Ireland in late 1960s the perception of the Catholic minority was that the British troops were there to persecute them but in reality, troops were sent to maintain order and protect both communities in Northern Ireland.
The conflicts in Kenya during the Kenyan emergency and the Northern Ireland troubles is comparable as both Small Wars came to an end because of the acceptance of the British regarding Kenyan of the need for independence and that
“David Anderson’s most recent study takes the same route, noting that after 1956, the British public were certainly aware that ‘the campaign in Kenya was a dirty business’. Enoch Powell’s public indignation at the Hola killing proved that if he, a rising star of the Right, believed that Britain had no right to be there if she could not show moral leadership of the highest order, then the game of empire was up.[2]”
This only highlights the understanding that in Small Wars in order to achieve victory requires understanding of public opinion in order to be successful and in order to achieve peace of victory in the conflict. But in contrast to Northern Ireland with these achieved until peace talks and the ceasefire in 1994 was because neither Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists willing to talk peace until peace became a far more enticing option because
“What was remarkable about the agreement was that it won the support of the leadership of both Sinn Fein and UUP[3]”.
By understanding the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Mau Mau rebellion shows that the conflict in Kenyan was resolved because of political realities but the conflict in Northern Ireland was not revolving to the political community in Northern Ireland willing to talk peace.
[1] Page Xi. Gangs and Counter-gangs, MAJOR FRANK KITSON, M.B.E., M.C., WITH A FOREWORD BY GENERAL SIR GEORGE ERSKINEG.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR ANDCOMMANDER IN CHIEF, JERSEY, FORMERLY C. IN C, KENYA , Published by (LONDON BARRIE AND ROCKLIFF, 1960)
[2] Page 2. Hilda Nissimi (Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Spring 2006, Vol. 8, Issue 3. ©Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2006. Mau Mau and the Decolonisation of Kenya, PDF online file:///D:/Users/Jonathan%20Riley/Downloads/131-241-1-PB.pdf
[3] Page 264 & 265 Dixion Paul, NORTHERN IRELAND THE POLICITICS OF WAR AND PEACE, Published by palgrave macmillan second edition 2008
Let the people choses
The Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975 the period that shall be covered in this dissertation will primarily focus on why United States a superpower failed to preserve South Vietnam as a democratic nation and why the North Vietnamese win the conflict with backing from Communist China. Also, during the discussion of why the United States lost the Vietnam war may include information from the First Indochina War began in French Indochina on 19 December 1946 and lasted until 1 August 1954. Fighting between French forces and their Viet Minh opponents in the south dated from September 1945.As well as the Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, and in Vietnam as the Resistance War Against America or simply the American War, was a conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 1 Nov 1955 – 30 Apr 1975.
One reason why great power such as United States failed to win the conflict in Vietnam is because the United States willingly fell into the old age trap of proxy war. A proxy war is usually where a power becomes embroiled in a conflict against an opponent which are believed to be a threat because the opponent maybe allied to part of the cause which the power engage in conflict is trying to destroy. This can clearly be seen throughout history such as Edward III son, known as Edward the Black prince to history and Duke of Aquitaine and Cornwall involvement in the Castilian Civil War which for England starts with involvement in 1365 until the culmination at the Battle of Nájera, also known as the Battle of Navarrete, was fought on 3 April 1367 near Nájera, in the province of La Rioja, Castile. During this conflict Charles V of France backed the opposing side while the Black Prince supported the other. The relevance to this point about proxy wars and why great powers lose proxy wars particularly when neighbouring powers are backing the power which a great power is trying to defeat. By using the example above is being used to highlight the great powers always suffer withdrawn to proxy war in the case of Charles V his plan worked fantastically because by the end of the 1360s Edward of Woodstock will be an invalid and most of the Aquitaine will be in French hands. So, the defeat of a great power in a proxy war either occurs through design or exceptional circumstances this can be seen when Chairman Mao Zedong stated in 1950 to a North Korean official that “if it takes 10 years or a hundred years we will be victorious[1]”. This statement made by Chairman Mao demonstrates the importance of proxy wars and how they can be responsible to great powers losing Small Wars. The difference between a proxy war and a small war is that not all proxy wars are Small Wars proxy wars where a great power such as Communist China backs the Vietcong will inevitably meet victory for the United States impossible which resulted in America’s withdraw in the Direct U.S. military involvement ended on 15 August 1973. The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese Army in April 1975 marked the end of the war, and North and South Vietnam were reunified the following year.
TET Offensive of 1968 marked the beginning of the end of US involvement in Vietnam is started As the celebration of the lunar new year, Tet is the most important holiday on the Vietnamese calendar. In previous years, the holiday had been the occasion for an informal truce in the Vietnam War between South Vietnam and North Vietnam (and their communist allies in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong). In early 1968, however, the North Vietnamese military commander General Vo Nguyen Giap chose January 31 as the occasion for a coordinated offensive of surprise attacks aimed at breaking the stalemate in Vietnam. Giap believed that the attacks would cause Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces to collapse and foment discontent and rebellion among the South Vietnamese population. Furthermore, Giap believed the alliance between South Vietnam and the United States was unstable he hoped the offensive would drive the final wedge between them and convince American leaders to give up their Défense of South Vietnam. In February 1968, in the wake of the Tet Offensive, KHE SANH ATTACKED In preparation for the planned offensive, Giap and the troops of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a series of attacks in the fall of 1967 on isolated American garrisons in the highlands of central Vietnam and along the Laotian and Cambodian frontiers. On January 21, 1968, PAVN forces began a massive artillery bombardment of the U.S. Marine garrison at Khe Sanh, located on the principal road from northern South Vietnam into Laos. As President Lyndon B. Johnson and General William Westmoreland focused their attention on the defense of Khe Sanh, Giap’s 70,000 poised to begin their true objective: the Tet Offensive. TET OFFENSIVE BEGINS On the early morning of January 30, 1968, Viet Cong forces attacked 13 cities in central South Vietnam, just as many families began their observances of the lunar new year. Twenty-four hours later, PAVN and Viet Cong forces struck a number of other targets throughout South Vietnam, including cities, towns, government buildings and U.S. or ARVN military bases throughout South Vietnam, in a total of more than 120 attacks. In a particularly bold attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, a Viet Cong platoon got inside the complex’s courtyard before U.S. forces destroyed it. The audacious attack on the U.S. Embassy, and its initial success, stunned American and international observers, who saw images of the carnage broadcast on television as it occurred. Though Giap had succeeded in achieving surprise, his forces were spread too thin in the ambitious offensive, and U.S. and ARVN forces managed to successfully counter most of the attacks and inflict heavy Viet Cong losses. THE BATTLE OF HUE Particularly intense fighting took place in the city of Hue, located on the Perfume River some 50 miles south of the border between North and South Vietnam. The Battle of Hue would rage for more than three weeks after PAVN and Viet Cong forces burst into the city on January 31, easily overwhelming the government forces there and taking control of the city’s ancient citadel. Early in their occupation of Hue, Viet Cong soldiers conducted house-to-house searches, arresting civil servants, religious leaders, teachers and other civilians connected with American forces or with the South Vietnamese regime. They executed these so-called counter-revolutionaries and buried their bodies in mass graves. U.S. and ARVN forces discovered evidence of the massacre after they regained control of the city on February 26. In addition to more than 2,800 bodies, another 3,000 residents were missing, and the occupying forces had destroyed many of the grand city’s temples, palaces and other monuments. The toughest fighting in Hue occurred at the ancient citadel, which the North Vietnamese struggled fiercely to hold against superior U.S. firepower. In scenes of carnage recorded on film by numerous television crews on the scene, nearly 150 U.S. Marines were killed in the Battle of Hue, along with some 400 South Vietnamese troops. On the North Vietnamese side, an estimated 5,000 soldiers were killed, most of them hit by American air and artillery strikes. Impact of the TET offensive Despite its heavy casualty toll, and its failure to inspire widespread rebellion among the South Vietnamese, the Tet Offensive proved to be a strategic success for the North Vietnamese. Before Tet, Westmoreland and other representatives of the Johnson administration had been claiming that the end of the war was in sight; now, it was clear that a long struggle still lay ahead. Westmoreland requested more than 200,000 new troops in order to mount an effective counteroffensive, an escalation that many Americans saw as an act of desperation. As anti-war sentiment mounted on the home front, some of Johnson’s advisers that had supported past military build-up in Vietnam now argued for scaling back U.S. involvement. On March 31, a beleaguered President Johnson declared that he was limiting the bombing of North Vietnam to the area below the 20th parallel (thus sparing 90 percent of communist-held territory) and calling for negotiations to end the war. At the same time, he announced that he would not be running for re-election that November. Though peace talks would drag on for another five years—during which more American soldiers were killed than in the previous years of the conflict—Johnson’s decision to halt escalation after the Tet Offensive marked a crucial turning point in American participation in the Vietnam War. Tet offensive shows that one of the main reasons that great powers lose Small Wars which has been a recurring theme throughout this dissertation is that without the support of the public victory becomes impossible. The failure of support at home to continue the conflict in Vietnam and during small wars is highly relevant to explaining why great powers lose Small Wars because the Peoples of great powers are unwilling to continue a conflict which they see as hopeless. The American public in the case of Vietnam saw the Vietnam war as pointless because by the late 1960s the red Terror which was a fear of communism and its influence spreading across the globe. The fear of communism dictated American foreign policy until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 so it must be understood that America’s involvement in Vietnam to begin with was partly motivated by fear of communism this must be understood because at the end of the second world war the Soviet Union control most of eastern and western Europe and in 1949 China became communist. It is with this context which helps explain why the United States became embroiled in Vietnam.
Overall Vietnam demonstrates that great powers lose Small Wars because without the ability to carry the support great powers will be defeated not by those they face but those from within because of declining public support to continue the war. The only real success in galvanising and supporting a long-term conflict with the commitment of lives resources and taxes only be seen during the first and second hundred years war. In the First Hundred Years War Edward third of England in 1340 and Henry V of England 1415 both of these rulers managed to maintain support for long-term war as well as the raising of taxes and the cost in lives. This point needs to be made because great powers particularly liberal democracies such as the United States and Great Britain will not be willing to fight a small war in a far-flung country for a long period of time spanning decades.
[1] Page 46. Neu E. Charles, America’s Lost War Vietnam: 1945-1975, Published by HARLAN DAVIDSON, INC. WHEELING, ILLINOIS 60090-6000
Back to Afghanistan and déjà vu
The final small war to be addressed in this dissertation is the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and 2003 invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. This dissertation will also be addressing the ongoing war on terror and important to state that like some wars possess a ideological component. In the case on the war on terror we must first understand the ideological backdrop in the West starting at the end of the Cold War in 1989. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama wrote an article called the end of history in this he plainly stated and articulated an argument that all ideological disputes are over and that Western liberal democracy has triumphed. In 2005 he retracted this argument and view of thinking because of the war on terror it must be understood that one of the drawers of terrorism in the West to groups like Al Qaeda and Islamic state is that the West in some ways is commerce and suffering from a lack of new ideas and inspiring ideology. This is relevant to why great powers lose Small Wars because the war on terror takes place in people’s bedrooms on laptops in mountains and on the battlefield because the war which United States and its allies face is one of ideology. Ideology in the context of Small Wars is relevant to understanding why great powers lose Small Wars because the current war on terror is fighting to inspire people to embrace westernisation and not a caliphate or conservative Islam. However, we can gain insight into the psyche of an Islamic terrorist with deep held conservative views Osama bin Laden ex-Al Qaeda leader and figurehead stated that
“our acts are reaction to your own acts, which are represented by the destruction and killing of our Kinfolk in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. The act that horrified the world-that is, the killing of the old, the handicapped Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, may god have mercy on him-is sufficient evidence.[1]”
This statement provides an insight on why great powers lose Small Wars in the case of the war on terror against Islamic fundamentalism it is a war that goes beyond the traditional realms of conflict in terms of military force because it is a war of ideas and philosophy. The West though it is not one political unit this dissertation requires that it must be treated as such because the in the West there is many creeds and ideology it is dominantly liberal and democratic. This means that we are facing an opponent that is conservative not in the Western sense but in the ultraconservative sense as being traditional to attitudes to guilt education and religion were as in the West we do not partake in religion to the same depth in the places in which we are fighting the war on terror. The statement by the Western journalist Patrick Cockburn who was in Iraq after the occupation of 2003 and the chaos which ensued the following year “As we drove out of Abu Ghraib we heard the voice of a preacher at a nearby mosque denouncing the occupation. ‘The occupiers’, he said, ‘now attack everybody and make life possible.’[2]”This environment of destruction and aggression against American and British troops in Iraq as well as “Iraqis asked, why were they attacking a sitting of 300,000 people? The result has been to turn Fallujah into a nationalist and religious symbol for all Iraqis.[3]” The reaction of the Iraqis to be occupied by the United States and its allies and the fact the coalition was caught off guard and ill-prepared shows that fighting the war on terror requires a political and cultural understanding in order to be successful. However, the United States does not possess this when regarding the war on terror because it is a conflict partly caused by economic and politically instability in the Middle East.
The spread of Islamic terrorism after the Arab spring in 2010 starting with revolution in Tunisia which is the only successful animation to emerge from the uprisings with a successful democracy pursuing a far more liberal outlook on governing and society. However, it must be understood that despite this call for democracy Islamic state has spread into Afghanistan Libya and in
“the summer of 2014, over the course of 100 days, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) transformed the politics of the Middle East. The Jihadi fighters combine religious fanaticism and military expertise to win spectacularly and unexpected victories against Iraq, Syria, and Kurdish forces.[4]”
The spread of terrorism after the Arab spring is due to multiple factors poverty in the Middle East and North Africa, perception of unfairness, corruption and tyranny in the countries that experienced revolution. The spread of terrorism after 2003 Iraq war and 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York America reacted suddenly and forcefully without truly understanding or comprehending undertaking of regime change and rebuilding in Afghanistan. This can be understood by the comments made General Richard Dannatt Head of the British Army 2006-2009 that United States suffered a strategic rate that being America suffered a trauma so extreme that they were not planning properly the long-term outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this lies the reason why great powers loose Small Wars because great powers do not truly comprehend the political environment which they forcibly occupy and try to fit into Western standards. With the United States and its Western coalition allies in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty organisation) attempting to copy and stick a Western constitution with Western institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq it inevitably leads to failure. These failures are partly responsible the rise of Islamic state because there is a miss held conception that democracy automatically provides prosperity and democracy. However great powers both liberal and tyrannical when attempting to dominate and enforce a particular system which they believe works best will ultimately lead to failure. Therefore, one of the greatest failures of why great powers lose Small Wars is that they ignore the development of nations and forget that all nations are built on piles of bones, for example underneath the catecholamines of Paris there lies over 40,000 skulls left over from 1778 French Revolution. The history of bloodshed in the development of nations cannot be sadly ignored even the European Union was built upon the legacy of the Second World War in order to ensure that there will not be further wars in Europe particularly between France and Germany. With the lack of understanding of nations were terrorism threats will ultimately lead to Small Wars which ultimately leads to defeat or withdraw forces for missions accomplish such as the ex-president Barack Obama withdrawing American troops from Iraq in 2010. Therefore, without understanding they will only be stumbling in the dark which leads to disaster such as the consequences and the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war which can be argued that the instability caused from the invasion is partly responsible for the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East.
[1] Page 198. 50 Speeches That Made the Modern World, Editor Andrew Burnet, Published by Chambers An Hachette UK company
[2] Page 78. Cockburn Patrick, THE AGE OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC STATE AND THE GREAT WAR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, Published by VERSO LONDON & New York in 2016
[3] Page 86. Cockburn Patrick, THE AGE OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC STATE AND THE GREAT WAR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, Published by VERSO LONDON & New York in 2016
[4] Page iX. Cockburn Patrick, THE RISE OF ISLAMIC STATE ISIS AND THE NEW SUNNI REVELOUTION, Published by VERSO LONDON & New York in 2014
Overall
Overall, this dissertation provides a conclusive and rounded understanding of why great powers lose Small Wars and the ultimate conclusion and aim of this work is to understand in the spirit of Carl von Clausewitz that war is fundamentally political. Therefore, with war being political and throughout this dissertation and through various case studies mentioned above it can be clearly understood that great powers lose Small Wars because they do not comprehend or are not willing to plan for a long drawn out conflict. It must be understood that most Small Wars, particularly ones that involve nation building or propping up a regime, the conflict will continue for decades where fighting a determined foe that is committed to victory, but great powers can afford defeat but small powers with non-traditional state actors will continue to fight for as long as there is a cause. The final conclusion of this dissertation is that some Small Wars are global and therefore become ideological and can span decades such as the fighting of Islamic terrorism since 911. Another conclusion that can be understood from this dissertation is that throughout the case studies there is repeating themes such as public support in order to win a small war but repeatedly great powers are unable to motivate long-term public support. With there being repeated themes throughout this dissertation it highlights the important fact that great powers and their respective political communities fail to learn lessons of history and are doomed to repeat the same mistakes this can be seen from Britain’s involvement in the Afghan Wars from 1838 to present-day.
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